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Introduction 
 
Over the past ten years or so, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have embarked on a 
new social policy trajectory. Known most for their high growth capacities,1 these East 
Asian developmental states have begun to shed their reputations as ‘welfare laggards’. 
With the implementation of universal health care, pensions and new social policy 
innovations in long term care for the elderly and in family care, the notion that East Asian 
developmentalism is singularly grounded in a ‘growth at all costs’ ethos seems less and 
less appropriate in today’s industrial East Asia. Though far from the benchmark of the 
European welfare state, we contend the direction of reform in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan is decidedly towards welfare state deepening. Indeed, social policies there are 
increasingly understood in universalist terms. They are inclusive. And social welfare has 
become legitimated by the language of social rights, and as such the provision of social 
protection is increasingly seen to be the responsibility of the state, and less so of the 
family and individuals. 
Recent developments in social policy reform in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
run counter to our intuitive expectations, and furthermore, to conventional theories of 
postwar welfare state development; these cases surely warrant analysis and are certain to 
illuminate important comparative insights. The processes of welfare deepening in East 
Asia have been initiated precisely at the time when welfare state retrenchment is the 
norm. Retrenchment ‘talk’ has pervaded policy discussions in all three countries, though 
so far had little effect on actual social policy reform decisions. Furthermore, East Asian 
welfare reform has come about in the absence of any programmatic political parties or 
strong labor union mobilization. The politics of welfare state formation there has not been 
driven by an institutionalized left, unlike in the European or Latin American 
experiences.2 And finally, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have overcome the legacies of 
the East Asian developmental state model where re-distributive social policy was 
perpetually subordinated to higher priorities in stimulating industrial transformation, and 
where social welfare was understood by policy elites to be anathema to economic 
growth.3 
Our contention is that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have begun to grow out of 
the postwar developmental state model. More specifically, the very conception of 
development has been re-defined to allow for greater social content in public policy; this 
despite contemporary pressures supposedly hostile to the development of the welfare 
state. Our argument is structured in three parts. First, we contend that growth with equity 
during the postwar period in Japan, Korea and Taiwan left a fortuitous legacy for current 
efforts in deepening the welfare state. The costs of social welfare reform – economically, 
politically and ideationally – have been minimized in these East Asian cases, unlike their 
developmental counterparts in, for instance, Latin America. Second, we argue that the 
dynamics of welfare state deepening in the region need to be understood as part of a 
larger structural change to the social foundations of East Asian societies. Demographic 
shifts and changing norms surrounding the family and gender relations have created new 
pressures on the East Asian developmental states, which have in turn responded by 
expanding the scope of social safety nets and by including constituencies, such as women 
and the elderly, who had previously been excluded. Third, we unpack the political 
mechanisms through which these developmental legacies and social pressures have 
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translated into concrete policy measures. Here we focus on the politics of democratic 
development in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and in particular, the political effects of 
political de-alignment and subsequent re-alignment on social policy agenda-setting. 
 
Growing Out of the Developmental State 
Explaining welfare reform during the 1990s in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
requires first an understanding of what has come to be known as the East Asian 
developmental state. Ian Holliday correctly points out that social policy regimes in East 
Asia during the postwar period were “productivist” in orientation. He contends that in the 
postwar developmental state “social policy [wa]s strictly subordinate[d] to the overriding 
policy objective of economic growth”.4 Holliday further stresses that social policy 
initiatives were de-linked from any conception of social rights and citizenship. For 
instance, universal access to education in Japan, Korea and Taiwan was not understood to 
be a mechanism for re-distributing wealth and equalizing opportunity for social class 
mobility, but rather as a means for human capital development, essentially an economic 
investment. Holliday therefore suggests that “minimal social rights” were “linked to 
productive activity” and that “state-market-family relationships” were “directed towards 
growth”.5  His is not a marginal view of East Asian social welfare.6 
Given the imperatives of catch-up development, the developmentally oriented 
states in Japan, Korea and Taiwan were by and large legitimated by their ability to 
promote rapid and aggregate economic growth.7 Distributive considerations were 
secondary in this narrow conception of development. Indeed, there was little political 
contestation around the distributive implications of growth; the rare instances of 
mobilization tended to be dealt with swiftly and authoritatively by the state. 
Policymaking processes in Japan, Korea and Taiwan were driven by economic 
technocrats, who were themselves politically insulated from outside social forces. Policy 
agendas were therefore set by the state and decisions made by state officials. As such, re-
distributive social policies, then, were marginalized. Things have changed, however. 
Beginning in the 1990s, social welfare reforms have emerged front-and-center in 
mainstream public policy agendas. This is the puzzle we seek to clarify.   
It is true that the Japanese welfare state originated in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
universal health insurance and pensions were first introduced.8 However, those initial 
reforms were established in a context where Keynesian notions of active state 
intervention, the idea of embedded liberalism, and the legitimacy of the welfare state 
more generally still resonated among industrialized countries. Also, these post-war social 
policy reforms constituted an integral part of Japan’s ‘catch-up’ development strategy. 
The conservative Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) decision to push for welfare state 
expansion in the 1970s signaled to the international community Japan’s entry into the 
family of advanced industrial nations, and at the same time demonstrated the 
government’s success in steering economic development. Thus, reforms in Japan, when 
put into this postwar context, were not all that counter-intuitive. Even South Korea and 
Taiwan introduced limited social insurance programs, though their reach was selective 
and thus far from universal.9 What is significant, however, and from our perspective very 
counter-intuitive, was the welfare deepening trajectory of the 1990s in Japan, and in 
Korea and Taiwan, during a time when the welfare state was believed to be compromised 
in the interest of lean governments and unfettered markets. 
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Social Spending 
There has been a significant increase in social security spending since the 1990s 
in Japan and the late 1980s in Korea and Taiwan. Japan’s initial welfare expansion came 
during the 1970s when social security spending nearly doubled from 4.8% of GDP in 
1970 to 10.2% in 1980. However, retrenchment efforts by the LDP in the 1980s curtailed 
any further rise in social spending, despite the fact that the proportion of people over the 
age of 65 increased from 9.1% to 12.0%.10 In the 1990s, expenditures increased again, 
and by 2001, social security spending had risen to 16.9%.11 Social security spending as a 
percentage of GDP in Korea went from 1.57% in 1980 to 3.1% in 1990, and increased 
sharply after the 1997 economic crisis to 6.1% of GDP in 2000.12 In Taiwan, social 
policy expenditures first increased during the 1980s when the provision of pension and 
survivors’ benefits were expanded (from 2.87% of GNP in 1980 to 4.81% in 1990), and 
again in the 1990s after the introduction of the National Health Insurance program in 
1995 (8.86% in 2000).13. 
[Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 here] 
 
Political Contestation 
Social welfare issues and social policy agendas have become an integral part of 
political contestation in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In this respect, the processes of 
growing out of the developmental state model have been embedded in the dynamics of 
political change. Along with that, norms surrounding democratic citizenship have been 
transformed. 
Japan has been democratic throughout the postwar period, though its political 
system was dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party until the early 1990s. The LDP 
did not hesitate to use social policy instruments in order to undermine opposition forces 
and to avert political crises during the 1960s and 1970s. But because the LDP controlled 
the policy agenda and its bureaucratic allies dominated the policy decision-making 
process, social policy reform in the past was not so much the result of political 
contestation as it was a compensatory tool to maintain the ruling party’s dominance.14 It 
was not until the 1980s, when the Japanese government began floating the idea of the 
‘Japanese welfare society’ – a not so veiled attempt to steer the social policy agenda 
towards retrenchment – that social welfare reform became a key domestic policy issue 
around which contending political actors, from both within and outside the LDP, 
mobilized support. This mainstreaming of social policy contestation became even more 
pronounced after the LDP lost power for the first time in 1993.15 Since that time, multi-
party competition and coalition building in Japan have turned social policy reform into a 
highly contested, and increasingly winning, political issue upon which to build electoral 
platforms. Social policy was put squarely on the agenda. 
Democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea have drawn greater attention 
to social policy issues among both policymakers and citizens. Though the politics of 
democratic consolidation in Taiwan centered primarily on issues of national identity, 
sovereignty and cross-straits relations (with China), social welfare policies and other 
‘new politics’ issues have nonetheless become core features of electoral competition.16 
The same can be said of Korea’s democratic transition. The student movement and 
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workers’ mobilization during the late 1980s ensured that social policy debates remained 
central in Korea’s emerging democracy.17 For instance, long-time dissidents Kim Dae-
Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun were elected to the presidency on what were seen to be 
distinctly social welfare policy agendas. In both places, social policy has increasingly 
become an important cleavage and basis for political contestation among policy 
entrepreneurs. As in Japan, social welfare has become a part of mainstream political 
debates. 
Inclusive Social Welfare 
That industrialization and economic development go hand in hand with the 
expansion of public spending and social policy innovation was empirically demonstrated 
long ago.18 The advanced industrial countries of the west experienced this, just as Japan 
did during the 1960s and 1970s. Even late industrializers such as South Korea and 
Taiwan experimented with social policy reform then, even though beneficiaries were 
limited to those employed in the ‘productive’ sectors of the formal labor market.19 What 
is interesting, from the vantage point of the 1990s, is that social welfare deepening took 
place in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan during a time when not only was the welfare 
state supposedly in decline, but in an era in which national economic growth had slowed 
considerably in these three countries. Despite poorer economic performance, particularly 
in the post financial crisis period, new social policies were implemented which targeted 
those groups that had been previously excluded. 
Universal health insurance was implemented in both South Korea and Taiwan 
during the 1990s. Recent efforts by the Korean government to consolidate the health 
insurance schemes were intended explicitly to promote greater re-distribution across 
wage earners and age groups.20 Furthermore, both the governments in Korea and Taiwan 
expanded social security measures, primarily with the extension of pension benefits to 
previously excluded workers and greater efforts to provide universal income support for 
the elderly. In South Korea, unemployment insurance was legislated to cover part-time 
workers, most of whom are women. Additionally, recent reforms to the Basic Livelihood 
Allowance Program, the Mother-Child Welfare scheme and current efforts to extend 
long-term elderly care broadened the scope of social welfare in South Korea.21 In 
Taiwan, the government established the Commission on Gender Equality in Education as 
well as the Gender Equality Labor Law to ensure women’s empowerment in entering or 
exiting the formal labor market. These new social policy packages include child care 
provisions as well as income support for single mother families. In both Taiwan and 
South Korea, tougher laws have also been implemented to protect women from domestic 
violence and workplace harassment.  
Social policy reform in Japan has followed a similar trajectory, though perhaps a 
little less dramatic given that many of Japan’s social insurance programs (health, 
pensions, and employment insurance) had been introduced earlier on. In Japan, a steady 
expansion of pension rights to women began in the mid-1980s with the standardization of 
the national pension scheme in 1985. The reforms ensured married women’s rights to a 
national basic pension, the first tier of the pension scheme. The 1989 reform further 
enforced compulsory pension payments from all citizens over the age of 20, including 
students. Throughout the 1990s, pension reforms continued, including payment holidays 
for workers on parental leaves and adjustments to the pension eligibility age from 60 to 
65 years. The 1989 Gold Plan in public elderly care was replaced by the 1997 Long Term 
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Care Insurance (LTCI) program, which in turn shifted eligibility for elderly care from 
mean-tested schemes to universalism. The government has funded 50% of the LTCI 
benefits through the general tax revenue, rather than relying solely on insurance 
premiums. The 1994 Angel Plan was implemented to provide social care and support for 
working families with dependent children. Through the expansion of public child care 
facilities and with the introduction in 1998 of a new income replacement program for 
parental leave, the Angel Plan has enabled families to better balance both domestic and 
workplace responsibilities.22 What is particularly significant about these recent social 
policy innovations in Japan is the fact that they have emerged from out of a larger social 
policy discourse that had earlier praised the principles of the Japanese ‘welfare society’ 
(of the 1980s) and the imperatives of state withdrawal from social protection schemes. 
Furthermore, the LTCI program and the Angel Plan represent a significant departure 
from the neo-Bismarckian social insurance model in Japan, towards a new principle of 
inclusive social citizenship based on what are increasingly understood to be universal 
social rights.  
Recent social policy reforms in Japan, Korea and Taiwan have been, for the most 
part, universally inclusive. In some instances, recent social policy initiatives have been 
unequivocally re-distributive, reflective of how Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have 
begun to grow out of the postwar developmental state mold. The rest of this paper 
examines these transformative processes. The following two sections lay out the 
structural backdrop against which current social policy reforms have been introduced. 
The last part of our argument examines more closely the political mechanisms through 
which these structural changes have translated into more active politics of social policy 
agenda-setting in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
 
Equity’s Place 
The postwar developmental state in East Asia was geared for rapid economic 
growth. It was, as Holliday and others have stressed, fundamentally productivist in its 
political and economic orientations.23 Indeed, an average of near 10% annual growth in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan between the 1960s and 1980s can in no way contradict 
this sort of characterization. They were, after all, miracle economies.24  
What was even more miraculous, however, was the degree to which economic 
growth in the region was accompanied by relative socio-economic equity. In terms of 
income distribution, the gini coefficient in Japan consistently hovered around 0.30 
between the mid 1960s through to 1980.25 In Taiwan, the gini was 0.32 in 1964 and 
stayed around 0.30 right up to the late 1980s.26 The gini indicator was higher in South 
Korea, ranging from a low of 0.35 in 1970 to 0.41 in 1985,27 but moved towards greater 
equality into the mid 1990s. By 1996, it had dropped to 0.28.28  Despite some variation 
among the three cases, as a group, and when compared to their developmental 
counterparts in Latin America – where gini coefficients were consistently between 0.50 
to 0.60 throughout the postwar period – it is clear that the distributions of income in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were quite egalitarian.29 
Growth and Equity 
Growth with relative equity in East Asia was no accident. It was, in many ways, 
by design of the postwar developmental state, politically and economically motivated on 
the part of the governing elite in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. In the case of Japan, the 
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ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to be mindful of equity concerns as it was 
challenged by both the Japanese socialist and communist parties in the early 1950s. In 
South Korea, the rise of student and worker movements during the late 1950s and early 
1960s forced the incoming Park Chung-Hee military regime to take seriously the 
distributive consequences of economic growth.30 In Taiwan, the authoritarian 
Kuomintang (KMT) regime, at one level, drew from the writings of party founder Sun 
Yat-Sen and his left-leaning principles of social, economic and political development .31 
More pressing for the KMT, however, were the ethnic divisions on the island. Ethnic 
conflict between the newly arrived Chinese mainlanders and local ethnic Taiwanese 
required that the KMT promote socio-economic equity in order to prevent the 
concentration of wealth among the Taiwanese, whom, by around the early 1970s, were 
beginning to mobilize against the KMT regime.32  
Growth with equity was not simply a political strategy; it was also a part of East 
Asia’s industrial modernization ambitions. Policymakers in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
understood equity’s place in the larger developmental project in the following way: 
macroeconomic policy and balanced industrial development, and not social policy, would 
foster equity. Growth and prosperity were always the pillars of the developmental state’s 
economic objectives. For instance, poverty alleviation was an important priority in 
Japan,33 though one that was embedded in the overriding imperatives of aggregate 
economic growth.34 Debates about how to balance growth fundamentals and socio-
economic equity were also evident in Taiwan and South Korea. In the end, growth-first 
policies were pursued by the three developmentally oriented states and flattening income 
disparities was anticipated to be a by-product of economic development more broadly 
defined. For instance, land reform, a process in which the landlord class was effectively 
broken and arable lands re-distributed, jumpstarted agricultural development. It also 
promoted greater socio-economic equity and thus narrowed the gap between social 
classes.35 
East Asia’s development strategy was also predicated on a rapid transition from 
an agrarian economy to an industrial one, which in turn, relied upon the rapid 
accumulation of human capital through education and training. By the 1960s, Japan was 
well on its way to becoming a leader in electronics manufacturing and heavy industry, 
while South Korea and Taiwan were catching up in light manufacturing. To facilitate 
continual industrial upgrading, the developmental states in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
quickly built up capacities for human capital development and labor up-skilling through, 
for instance, emphasis on universal education and the extension of accessible education. 
In Japan, high school enrollment rates rose sharply from 70.7% in 1965 to 91.9% in 1975 
as the national government made a concerted push to expand public education; by 2000 
the enrollment rate had reached 95.9%.36 Similarly in Korea, high school advancement 
rates were 99.5% in 2000, increasing from 90.7% in 1985, and from 74.7% in 1975.37 
The high school enrollment rate in Taiwan also from 65.8% in 1975 to 95.3% in 2000.38  
Policymakers in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan indirectly promoted socio-
economic equity through a strategy of full employment. In Japan and South Korea, large 
diversified firms were nurtured by the developmental state. The ‘income doubling plan’ 
of 1960 in Japan39 and wage increases amidst the heavy and chemical industrial drive of 
1972 in South Korea40 typified this macroeconomic strategy of economic prosperity and 
equity. Taiwan’s industrial base, on the other hand, was built upon the proliferation of 
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small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This industrialization model facilitated 
worker mobility and consequently narrowed the gap between social classes.41 In all three 
cases, industrialization built up firms, which in turn provided employment opportunities 
for skilled and non-skilled workers alike.  
Growth with equity in Japan, Korea and Taiwan was not explicitly driven by re-
distributive social policy measures. On this score, the East Asian states did not differ too 
much from their Latin American counterparts. Some progressive taxation was 
implemented in Japan, though the re-distributive effect of this was mitigated, as it was in 
Taiwan and Korea, due to the high rate of income under-reporting, particularly among 
self-employed workers. As indicated above, some social policy initiatives (health and 
pensions) were implemented earlier on in Japan, though then social safety nets were 
provided primarily at the enterprise level. Universal social policy was next to none 
throughout the postwar period in Taiwan and South Korea. Limited social insurance 
programs were implemented, though these schemes by and large benefited only those 
who were formally employed, and in the case of Korea, those working in large firms, 
essentially the labor aristocracy. To reiterate, then, growth with equity in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, at least during the immediate postwar period, was more the result of 
poverty alleviation strategies through employment and aggregate economic growth, 
rather than purposive re-distributive social policy. 
 
Legacies of Equitable Economic Development 
Evaluating the extent to which growth with equity in East Asia was driven by 
reasons of political expediency (co-opt the left, undermine opposition forces) or the result 
of macroeconomic fundamentals (wage growth through economic productivity) is not our 
main concern here. Rather, what matters were the legacies of this particular pattern of 
economic development on subsequent patterns of social welfare reform in the region. It is 
our contention that the legacies of equitable economic growth impacted (i) the economics 
of social welfare reform, (ii) the dynamics of social class politics, and (iii) the normative 
place of social policy change in contemporary understandings of development. The 
legacies of growth with equity shaped the context in which current social policy debates 
have been played out, and in which social welfare deepening has become a principled 
priority.  
Social welfare policy is fundamentally about the re-distribution of wealth, about 
creating winners and losers. As such, the relatively egalitarian distributions of income in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have made it easier for policymakers today to consider 
re-distributive social policy as a way of maintaining growth and equity. We are 
constantly reminded by our Latin American colleagues that a key structural factor 
favoring social welfare reform in industrial East Asian countries has been their histories 
of relative income equality.42 The economic costs of re-distribution across wage groups 
and disparate households and/or demographic communities are much lower because the 
amount to be re-distributed is less onerous. In this respect, the economics of welfare 
deepening in East Asia has been much less constrained by structural obstacles endemic to 
wide gulfs in extant distributions of income. For Latin American social policy reformers, 
on the other hand, the high costs of re-distribution across very unequal income groups 
have limited their options.  
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Second, growth with equity in Japan, Korea and Taiwan has lowered the political 
costs associated with re-distributive social welfare reform. Again, the contrast with 
developments in Latin America is instructive. In industrial Chile, Mexico and Brazil, 
social class politics are very divisive. Social policy reform – either deepening or 
retrenchment – is understood as a zero-sum game, economically and politically. One 
social class benefits at the expense of others. Because of this, class conflict is played out 
in the formal political arena.43 People in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, on the other hand, see 
themselves as being a part of ‘classless’ societies. More precisely, they understand theirs 
to be middle class societies. This is not to say that class politics have been completely 
obscured in East Asia. Class-based movements erupted in Japan during the 1950s and 
again in the 1970s.44 In South Korea, the minjung movement of the 1970s and 1980s 
reflected class cleavages, even though statistically, the distribution of income was 
comparatively egalitarian.45 Still, according to objective and subjective indicators, 
Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese societies have been largely middle class since around 
the late 1970s. To be sure, Japanese society was constituted by what scholars have called 
the ‘new middle mass’ during the 1980s.46 Today the overwhelming majority of 
Taiwanese and Koreans similarly identify themselves as being from the middle class.47 
Simply put, class consciousness, as understood by sociologists, has been muted in East 
Asian politics.48  
The political effect of ‘classlessness’ in East Asia has been the de-radicalization 
of visceral class politics and social welfare contestation. In the case of Japan, Murakami 
notes that the “people of the new middle mass do not see the issues around them in 
ideological terms of class conflict or of revolution”.49 The relative absence of social class 
cleavages has meant that the political costs of initiating social welfare reform are much 
lower in East Asia. In contrast to their developmental counterparts in Latin America, 
welfare deepening in Japan, Korea and Taiwan is not regarded as wholly benefiting or 
privileging one class over another. Indeed, when 90% of one’s society considers itself to 
be of the middle class – as is the case in Japan50 – social policy reform tends not to be 
understood as a necessarily vicious, and thus politically costly, zero-sum game.  
Third, growth with equity in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has inculcated and 
strengthened the normative place of equity in the larger East Asian developmental 
project. As Milly points out, the legitimacy of equity as a socio-economic goal in Japan is 
as much about normative principles as it is about interest-based power politics.51 This is 
important when it comes to policy agenda setting.52  Even though equity was 
subordinated to rapid economic growth during postwar period in East Asia, the legacies 
of growth with equity, and the normative place of equity thereafter, have nonetheless 
acted as a principled brake or constraint on the legitimacy of the growth-at-all-costs 
ethos. It is within this normative framework that social policy reform has been discussed 
and in turn how welfare state deepening has been facilitated in Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea. 
Given their shared experiences of relatively egalitarian growth throughout the 
postwar period, East Asians have come to expect some degree of socio-economic equity 
in the distribution of wealth and in the distribution of opportunity. No matter how much 
policymakers may ascribe to market-based economic principles, people in Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea, including state-level policymakers, are able to tolerate only so much socio-
economic disparity. According to World Values Survey data from the late 1990s, of 43 
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countries, Japanese and Korean respondents ranked 4th and 6th lowest in terms of 
tolerance for income inequality. Public opinion polls in Taiwan and Korea show that the 
majority of citizens there feel that income inequality needs to be narrowed and that social 
welfare reform should be made a policy priority.53 Polls in Japan indicate that social 
welfare follows closely behind economic recovery as the top concern for people over the 
age of 20.54 The Prime Minister’s Office’s opinion survey of 1994 also found that 
resolving social welfare and elderly care issues were a higher priority than all other 
issues, including economic growth.55 The overwhelming majority of bureaucrats and 
legislators in Korea and Taiwan believe that the welfare state is a fundamental 
characteristic of democracy and that social and economic inequality leads to political 
conflict.56 
The implications of this normative and political context are not trivial, particularly 
in terms of how these polities have dealt with the forces of economic globalization. For 
instance, when the IMF intervened to bail out the Korean economy during the 1997 
financial crisis, most expected that the nascent Korean welfare state would be forced to 
undergo retrenchment. Instead, President Kim Dae-Jung used this window of opportunity 
to in fact deepen welfare reform in the face of growing inequality, joblessness, and labor 
unrest. Reforms were consequently initiated in the areas of health care, income security, 
employment insurance and job re-training. Though Taiwan was not as severely afflicted 
by the 1997 financial crisis, policymakers and social policy activists there quickly learned 
that social protection for the vulnerable could be preempted through social welfare 
reform. In both places, the welfare state was understood not to be anathema to current 
global economic realities, but rather, an important buffer to the socio-economic vagaries 
of globalization.57 Likewise in Japan, when the economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, 
and when new economic cleavages began to emerge in Japanese society,58 the 
government responded with new social welfare policies, focusing specifically on active 
labor market measures, family policy, and long term care for the elderly.59 
In sum, people in East Asia, elites and the general public alike, have come to 
expect some degree of socio-economic equity. Moreover, given that past practices in 
promoting growth with equity through full employment and trickle-down policies have 
become less viable options given current economic realities, policymakers in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan – themselves beholden to the norms of socio-economic equity – have 
increasingly turned to inclusive and re-distributive social policy. 
 
Social and Demographic Changes 
While the experience of growth with equity has provided the normative context 
for more inclusive social policy, the actual content of social policy reforms in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan has been shaped by changes in demographic structure, as well as in 
family and gender relations. First, all three countries have experienced population aging 
(Table 1) and fertility decline. Although both Korea and Taiwan are demographically 
younger compared to Japan and other OECD countries,60 the increase in the number of 
aged people in these two countries will outpace Japan over the coming decades. The 
proportion of the elderly population in Korea and Taiwan is expected to be much closer 
to Japan by 2035, at around 25% of the population.61 Simply put, Korea and Taiwan will 
soon experience a similarly rapid aging process, though in a much more compressed time 
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frame. This demographic shift will inevitably create pressures on the social safety net, as 
it has in Japan. 
Insert Table 1 
 
Second, the proportion of three or more generation households in these three 
countries has declined over the last few decades. At the same time, the number of single 
person households has increased, suggesting an erosion of ‘traditional’ living 
arrangements wherein elderly people live with and are cared for by their adult children. 
In Japan the proportion of households that are three generations or more declined from 
16.2% to 10.6% between 1980 and 2000, while the proportion of single person 
households in Japan increased from 18.1% to 24.1%. During the same time period, the 
proportion of three or more generation households in Korea dropped from 17.0% to 
8.4%, while single person households rose from 4.8% to 15.5%.62 Similar changes can be 
seen in Taiwan, where the proportion of three or more generation households declined 
from 25.1% of all households to 16.4% between 1990 and 2000, and where single person 
households increased from 12.2% to 18.9% in those ten years.63  
Changes in marriage patterns and gender relations are also evident. Divorce rates 
and the proportion of single mother families have increased in the three countries. In 
Japan, the divorce rate doubled between 1980 and 2000 (12.2% to 21.0%), in Korea it 
increased by approximately six-fold (5.9% to 35.9%), and in Taiwan the divorce rate rose 
from 14.0% to 23.8%. This increase is attributed to changes in public attitudes towards 
marriage and divorce, particularly among younger people, as well as attitudes regarding 
the burden of familial care in the case of divorce among older couples.64 Studies in Korea 
also suggest that most divorces are caused by family breakdown during times of 
economic hardship, such as the 1997 financial crisis.65 The increase in the number and 
proportion of single mother families in Japan (4% of all the households in 1980 to 6% in 
2000) and Korea (3.9% to 5.6% between 1980 and 2000) closely parallels the increases in 
their respective divorce rate. Finally, the employment rate among married women in all 
the three countries has risen, indicating again a shift in attitudes about gender relations in 
the household and women’s relationships to the labor market. 
Insert Table 2 
The implications of changing family and gender relations on social policy are not 
trivial. First, demographic aging and fertility declines continue to exert pressures on the 
social security system, particularly as the schemes mature and begin to pay out. Second, 
demographic aging and declining fertility rates, in the absence of policy alternatives such 
as those encouraging inward immigration, exert pressure on these countries in dealing 
with long term labour shortages and possible population decline.66 In the case of Japan, it 
is projected that its population will decline to half the current size by the end of this 
century. Third, changes in household structures and married women’s employment rate 
increases have resulted in demands for social care for the elderly and children. This issue 
has been further compounded in the case of Japan and Korea by the fact that increasing 
women’s labour market participation is considered a more desirable option than 
increasing immigration rates. Finally, the increase in the number of single mother 
families and rising poverty rates among them have led to ambivalent policy responses in 
these countries. In Korea and Taiwan, there has been an expansion of gender-based 
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income maintenance policies,67 while in Japan, recent policy reforms have emphasized 
the linkages between single mothers and employment.68 
Given these social and demographic changes in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and 
given the normative place of socio-economic equity in these societies, it should come as 
no surprise that more attention has been paid to inclusive and redistributive social 
policies. In the aggregate, social security spending as a percentage of GDP rose sharply 
during the 1990s in all three countries. There has also been a significant increase in the 
specific provision of social welfare support and social care. In Japan, welfare 
expenditures doubled between 1990 and 2000, most of which went to the expansion of 
social care provisions in elderly care (from ¥0.57 to ¥0.3.57 trillion) and the support of 
families and children, comprising public child care, after school programs, and family 
support programs (¥1.6 to ¥2.74 trillion)69 (see figures 4 and 5 below).   
 
(Insert Figures 4 and 5 here) 
 
In Korea, social welfare expansion has been even more striking. Government 
expenditures for the employment insurance program increased from 4.7 million won in 
1996 to 306,172 million won in 1999. Expenditures for childcare grew from 41,876 
million won to 436,903 million won between 1991 and 2002 and government outlays for 
elderly welfare increased from 37,861 million won to 407,767 million won over the last 
decade.70  
Political Entrepreneurship 
Thus far, we have drawn attention to the historical and structural backdrops 
against which current efforts in social welfare deepening have occurred in Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan. However, we do not take for granted that the emergence of new pressures or 
constituencies for welfare state expansion necessarily leads to significant changes to pre-
existing social policy agendas. To put it crudely, the mere presence of old people does 
not necessarily mean aged-friendly social policy. This next section elaborates on the 
political dynamics of social welfare policymaking in present-day Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. We argue that political change during the late 1980s and into the 1990s has 
facilitated new opportunities for social welfare policy agenda-setting. Strategic 
interaction between political elites from above and civil society mobilization from below 
has put social policy reform and welfare state deepening onto the mainstream political 
agenda. 
Prior to the late 1980s, when Korea and Taiwan began democratizing, and prior to 
the early 1990s, when the LDP lost power for the first time in 38 years, opportunities for 
social policy debate were constrained. There were few openings for such deliberation. 
Opportunities to steer social welfare agendas from outside the developmental state 
apparatus were rare, as in the case of Japan, and non-existent, such as in authoritarian 
Taiwan and Korea. The limited degree of social policy change in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, then, was entirely state-led. The political space required for a more interactive 
process of social policymaking was simply not there. 
Opportunities to re-configure social policy agendas did emerge during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however. Democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea and 
the defeat of the LDP in Japan during the early 1990s resulted in political de-alignment, a 
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process that created the political space for the emergence of new political actors and a 
new competitive dynamic. Opposition parties were formed in Taiwan and Korea. In 
Japan, the party system was re-constructed, with several new splinter parties spinning-off 
from out of the ailing LDP. The subsequent process of political re-alignment in the three 
cases opened up the issue space in which new policy agendas and ideas, including those 
related to social welfare reform, could come to the fore. 
 
Political De-Alignment 
Though martial law in Taiwan was not lifted until 1987, the opposition 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, illegally, the year before. Born out of 
the pro-independence Tangwai movement of the 1970s, the DPP was able to mobilize its 
grassroots bases quite effectively. The KMT continued to hold onto power, winning 
legislative elections in 1992 and the presidential elections in 1996. Yet, its support base 
slowly diminished during the early to mid 1990s as the DPP emerged as a possible 
contender. The DPP challenge was not insignificant, even back then. Similarly in South 
Korea, the incumbent authoritarian party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), was forced 
to confront opposition challengers soon after President Roh Tae-Woo announced direct 
presidential and full legislative elections during the summer of 1987. Grassroots leaders 
Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung formed two opposition parties in May of that year. 
Though they failed to contend for the presidency in 1987, essentially splitting the 
opposition vote, their combined vote total for the spring legislative elections in 1988 was 
higher (43%) than the incumbent DJP’s vote share (34%). In both Taiwan and South 
Korea, the initiation of democratic reform forced a political de-alignment as new parties 
were not only formed, they contended early on. 
The process of de-alignment in Japan was slightly different, though the political 
consequences were similar. Mired in scandals and the weight of Japan’s sluggish 
economic performance in the early 1990s, the LDP was defeated in legislative elections 
in 1993. For the first time, and albeit for only a short time, the LDP was in the opposition. 
Discontent within the party erupted and longstanding factional splits were cemented by 
the creation of new splinter parties. The Japan New Party was created in 1992 by LDP 
defectors, and it later joined the New Frontier Party coalition in 1994. The Shinseito 
(‘renewal’) party and the Sakigake (‘harbinger’) party were also formed by LDP 
defectors vowing to democratize Japanese politics through political and electoral reforms. 
According to Mayumi Itoh, over 20 new parties were formed after 1993.71 Electoral 
reform in 1994 fuelled the de-alignment process, even though the reforms were originally 
intended to facilitate a stable two-party system in Japan.72 Small parties continued to 
proliferate. The Japanese Socialist Party renamed itself the Social Democratic Party, 
signaling the moderation on the left wing. This in turn gave renewed life to the Japanese 
Communist Party.73 More and more independent candidates were also declared.  
Not unlike the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea, the dawning of the new 
post-LDP hegemonic era in Japan resulted in a process of political de-alignment. This 
created a new competitive dynamism, or what we call political space, that had rarely been 
experienced in Japan, and never before in Taiwan and South Korea. The incumbent 
parties’ hold on to power was no longer a foregone conclusion. Opportunities for new 
patterns of policymaking, and the emergence of new social welfare agendas more 
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specifically, emerged in this charged political setting. Simply put, de-alignment pried 
open what were once closed political systems. 
 
Political Re-Alignment 
Political de-alignment was a process fraught with uncertainty and chaos; in chaos, 
however, actors adjusted. They strategically re-aligned themselves, forged new identities, 
cultivated new bases of political support and ultimately scramble for new issues with 
which to gain electoral advantage. The processes of re-alignment in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan reshaped the political landscape and the dynamics of democratic competition, 
making way for new social policy agenda items. 
During the immediate post-transition period in Taiwan, the principal cleavage in 
electoral competition was over the resolution of the independence versus reunification 
with China issue. Yet, given that the majority of voters in Taiwan sought to maintain the 
status quo (neither independence nor reunification), this particular cleavage was found to 
be irreconcilable in the short term. It soon became clear that this single cleavage structure 
was stagnant. New issues were needed to energize political competition.74 Political 
entrepreneurs in Taiwan thus re-aligned themselves around new cleavages in order to 
capture new bases of electoral support.75 Similarly in South Korea, single cleavage 
competition based on personal/regional affiliations had also become stagnant. As in 
Taiwan, new issues and thus new bases of competition needed to be mobilized in South 
Korea. It was through this process of political re-alignment that the idea of social welfare 
quickly gained prominence. Welfare proved to be a winning issue. Indeed, social policy 
reform was particularly attractive in this process of re-alignment because it effectively 
cross-cut the existing regional or ethnic cleavages dominant in Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
democratic politics.76 
The Japanese case was a bit more complex, though the logic of re-alignment is 
not inconsistent with the foregoing analysis of Taiwan and Korea. In Japan, the 
proliferation of new political parties and the fractionalization of the party system created 
new opportunities for political actors to re-define themselves, and in the course of this re-
alignment, to gain new bases of political support. Parties needed to differentiate 
themselves from each other. The LDP, for instance, could no longer position itself as a 
catch-all party, a strategy that had served it well when its competitors were weak and its 
hold on power uncontested. In other words, the LDP could no longer be everything for 
everyone. It was expected, therefore, that competition in Japanese politics would become 
more issue-oriented.  
With a significant portion of the electorate not affiliated with any political party, 
political entrepreneurship became a premium in Japan. According to T.J. Pempel, “the 
system [wa]s ripe for the emergence of political entrepreneurs able to mobilize voters 
around their increasingly divergent interests”.77 The changing socio-economic profile of 
Japanese voters – increased mobility, tightened labor markets, growing income disparity, 
and demographic pressures – compelled parties and their leaderships to adjust their 
strategies and their target constituencies. For instance, the declining relevance of the rice 
coalition in the countryside forced the LDP to diversify its core voters. Other parties were 
forced to adjust too. The Japanese Socialist Party moved towards the center, hoping to 
capture a broader base of electoral support.78 This of course made room for the new 
socialist party and the resurgent Japanese Communist Party. Small splinter parties also 
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came to play increasingly important roles in the policy process as partners in coalition 
building.79 
Political re-alignment in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea resulted in new patterns 
of political entrepreneurship centered around issues of social welfare. Although its impact 
in Japan was not as dramatic as in democratizing Taiwan and South Korea, we can 
nevertheless conclude that through the process of re-alignment and coalition building, the 
Japanese political system and the political entrepreneurs who animate Japanese politics, 
were forced to be more receptive to new policy agendas, and social welfare reform 
figured centrally. The opportunities for entrepreneurial agenda-setting were therefore 
present in Japan, especially in the years after the LDP shake-up.  
 
Societal Mobilization 
To say that the politics of social welfare deepening in East Asia has solely been 
the product of top-down political entrepreneurship is to overstate our case a bit. The 
opening up of political and issue space has made politics in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
more receptive to new ideas. Still, the energy behind this new politics has come, in part, 
from the bottom-up and from out of a rejuvenated civil society. Put another way, the 
politics of social welfare policy agenda setting has been shaped by the interaction of state 
and societal actors. 
Prior to the 1990s, civil society mobilization in Japan was sparse. What little civic 
activism there was tended to be local, and usually in reaction to some specific 
grievance.80 Non-governmental mobilization then was neither national in scope nor very 
pro-active. By the 1990s, however, things had changed. Riding the wave of voluntarism 
and increased social activism after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, the Japanese 
government passed a revised non-profit organization (NPO) bill in 1998, easing 
restrictions on group formation and eliminating bureaucratic intervention in their 
operations. By year end 2001, over 5,500 new organizations had been formed.81 Robert 
Pekkanen suggests that this resulted in a “shift in the state-society power balance” in 
terms of how public interest issues are dealt with.82  
For instance, the Women’s Committee for the Improvement of Aged Society 
(WCIAS) in Japan was a key player in the long term care insurance (LTCI) reform 
process of the 1990s. The WCIAS was a member of both the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare’s policy advisory body and the specific research task force in charge of the LTCI 
reform. According to ministry bureaucrats, the WCIAS was instrumental in shaping the 
reform outcome, advocating for long term care as a right of citizenship and demanding 
changes be made to the compensation scheme. The outcome of the reform bill was 
initially threatened by conservative factions in the LDP, which tried to steer the reform 
agenda away from such rights-based claims. In response, the WCIAS partnered with the 
Sawayaka Welfare Association and in turn launched a national political campaign, the 
‘Ten-Thousand Citizens Committee for Long Term Care Insurance’. The organizations 
lobbied politicians and industry organizations. They effectively ran a media campaign, 
gaining even more support from the citizenry. Through an alliance with the Democratic 
Party, the opposition was able to pass the reform bill, winning the legislative support of 
some LDP defectors and independents along the way.83 
Civil society actors’ roles in steering social policy agenda-setting and social 
policy decision-making have been even more pronounced in democratizing Taiwan and 
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South Korea. In Taiwan, for instance, over 200 social movement groups joined together 
in 1998 to make the ‘National Health Insurance Coalition’ (NHIC). The grassroots 
alliance was formed in response to KMT efforts initiated in 1997 to privatize Taiwan’s 
universal health insurance system. The NHIC comprised different groups, ranging from 
women’s organizations to the independent labor movement, from professional medical 
associations to organizations representing children and the aged. The movement coalition 
effectively cut across class lines as well as other social cleavages. Drawing on not only its 
grassroots networks, the NHIC also enlisted the assistance of outside health policy 
experts (including one high ranking health bureaucrat) to draft the coalition’s manifesto. 
The NHIC, like the WCIAS in Japan, comprised what we might call ‘expert-activists’. 
The NHIC petition, which detailed arguments against the privatization reform proposal 
and articulated tenable policy alternatives, was then circulated to all legislators and 
Ministry of Health bureaucrats. Politicians and bureaucrats were swayed. Many health 
officials balked at the KMT’s privatization plan and several KMT legislators voted 
against the party leadership’s proposal. As a result, the privatization reform failed to pass 
in the legislature.84 
The impact of civil society’s transformation has also been felt in Korea’s recent 
efforts in social policy innovation. During the late 1990s the Korean government 
legislated and eventually implemented (in 2003) the health insurance integration reform, 
a measure that administratively and financially consolidated what were then hundreds of 
decentralized regional and enterprise-based medical insurance schemes. The intention 
was to maximize risk pooling among different patient profiles, as well as to facilitate 
greater re-distribution across disparate income households. As in Taiwan and Japan, civil 
society mobilization and bottom-up policy advocacy were critical in steering the reform 
agenda towards this reform trajectory, and ultimately in determining the legislative 
outcome. The integration reform idea initially faced tremendous opposition from industry 
and conservative politicians. However, broad-based grassroots mobilization compelled 
the newly Kim Dae-Jung administration, and even opposition legislators, to pass the 
reform. Health Solidarity took the lead, forging a cross-class alliance with the middle 
class civic groups on the one hand and the usually isolationist Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU) on the other. Health Solidarity, like the NHI Coalition in Taiwan, 
also enlisted outside policy experts to advise the coalition’s core constituent groups. By 
positioning themselves as expert-activists, social movement leaders were invited to be a 
part of the executive’s policy planning process, gaining membership on to several agenda 
setting committees in the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the ruling party’s social 
policymaking division.85 
In sum, civil society groups have become important social policy advocates in 
East Asia. By taking advantage of the processes of political de-alignment and re-
alignment during the mid 1990s, societal organizations have positioned themselves to be 
key sources of policy innovation, especially in social welfare reform. Societal groups 
have effectively mobilized their grassroots bases as a way of gaining electoral voice, 
particularly as traditional vote-mobilizing networks (koenkai) and old-style pork barrel 
politics are now less useful in Japan and in democratizing Taiwan and South Korea.86 
Finally, social movement groups have quickly accumulated valuable policy expertise, 
thus facilitating their access into bureaucratic and legislative policymaking networks, and 
ones from which they had previously been shut out. The interactions of state and non-
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state actors in this democratic political space have consequently re-shaped policy agenda-
setting processes wherein social policy ideas have not only emerged as important issues 
in civil society’s grassroots but they have also been flagged as winning issues for 
government policymakers. 
Conclusion 
This paper has offered structural and political explanations for social policy 
expansion in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 1990s. We have argued that 
while the productivist welfare regime approach to social policy development in East Asia 
contributed useful insights to comparative welfare state debates, its explanations are no 
longer adequate given the changes that have taken place over the last decade or so. 
Instead, we offer explanations based on a combination of structural and political factors. 
We have argued that welfare state expansions observed in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
were in part shaped by social and demographic shifts, such as demographic aging 
combined with low fertility and changes in family structures and gender relations. In 
addition, these reforms reflected a prevailing normative understanding of equitable 
economic development, a principle that became entrenched during the postwar period.  
While these social and demographic factors created pressures on, and motivations 
for, welfare state deepening, the mechanisms for social policy change were constituted by 
significant changes to domestic politics in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Why, at a 
time of economic contraction and when international trends were pointing to fiscal 
conservatism, did these three East Asian countries choose the route of welfare state 
expansion? We contend that a new politics of the welfare state in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan was possible because of new domestic political dynamics. The process of 
political de-alignment in Japan after the collapse of the LDP hegemony in 1993 and the 
on-going political re-alignment process in Korea and Taiwan since the mid-1990s created 
new political incentives for welfare state expansion. These processes encouraged new 
patterns of political entrepreneurship centered on social welfare issues, and created 
openings for emergent civil society groups to participate in social policymaking 
processes. 
In presenting our analysis, we have eschewed the urge to explain social policy 
development in East Asia based on a fixed regime template. Rather, we have sought for a 
more careful examination of the interaction between structural and political factors that 
have shaped and re-shaped new social policy reform trajectories. In doing so, we have 
also moved our attention away from explaining East Asian welfare states with static 
regime typologies towards explaining welfare state policy reform in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan by mapping out and re-configuring broad changes to their polity, economic and 
society. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Aging Population (% population over 65), 1980-2020 
 1980 2000 2020 
Japan 9.1 18.5 (2002) 25 
Korea 6.2 7.2 14.5 
Taiwan 6.2 (1990) 9.4 17.0 
Sources: Japan Institute of Labor (2003); Korean National Statistics Office (2003) Future Household 
Projection; Director-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuen, Taiwan (2004) The 
Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China. 
 
 
Table 2: Women’s Economic Activity Rate in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1960-2000 
 1960 1980 2000 
Japan 
Women 
Married women 
 
45.8 (1975) 
45.2 (1975) 
 
47.6 
49.2 
 
48.2 
52 
Korea 
Women 
Married women 
 
37.0 (1963) 
36.9 (1963) 
 
42.8 
40.0 
 
48.3 
47.9 
Taiwan 
Women 
Married women 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
39.2 
44.4 (1993) 
 
45.7 
47.0 (1997) 
Sources: Nihon Fujin Dantai Rengokai (1999) Fujin Hakusho 1998 ; KWDI (2003) Statitstical Chart on 
Women. 
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Figure 1: Public Social Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, 1980 – 2001, Japan 
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Source: OECD, Social Expenditure Database, 2004 
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Figure 2: Public Social Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1990 – 2001, Korea 
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Figure 3: Public Social Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP, 1980-200, Taiwan 
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Source: Executive Yuan, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2003 (Taiwan: DGBAS) 
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Figure 4: Social Expenditures on the Elderly as Proportion of Total Social Security, 
1984-2000, Japan 
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Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, The Cost of Social Security in 
Japan, FY 1969-2002 (Tokyo: NIPSSR, 2004) 
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Figure 5: Expenditure on Families & Children Relative to Number of Children 0-14 
years, 1975-2002, Japan 
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